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**Negotiating Britain's Membership of the European Communities:
1961-3 and 1971-2.**

By Sir Christopher Audland and Sir Roy Denman,

Special *Jean Monnet* issue edited by R. Ranieri

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INTRODUCTION

By Ruggero Ranieri[?]

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The papers by Sir Christopher Audland and Sir Roy Denman are the transcripts of two lectures, delivered, in the context of the Jean Monnet Action Programme, at the Department of History of the University of Manchester during the academic year 1998-1999. They are interesting both for what they say and for the personality of their authors. As may be seen in the brief biographical sketches below, both Christopher Audland and Roy Denman were civil servants, who, after a distinguished track record in Whitehall, spent mostly, although not exclusively, in dealing with European integration issues, finished their career as Director Generals in the EU Commission. They played an important part respectively in the first unsuccessful accession negotiations of 1961-3 and in the negotiations of 1971-2, which led to UK membership of the EC/EU. Roy Denman, in fact, as a representative first of the Board of Trade and then of the Department of Trade and Industry, was present at both negotiations, although during the first he acted rather from the sidelines. During the second one, however, he was a key member of the British negotiating team. Christopher Audland's role in the first negotiation, although not a senior one, was important since he, together with his Foreign Office colleague John Robinson, co-ordinated the work of the UK Delegation in Brussels.

There is an impressive historical literature on the UK's accession negotiations. Particularly the 1961-3 negotiations, whose records are now public, have been the subject of an unending stream of article and monographs, exploring some of their more minute details.¹ It might be asked whether these papers add something to this literature. The answer would be that, at least on points of fact, they do not add very much. They do, however, provide a number of interesting details as well as an informed, clear summary. Furthermore they convey the views of two protagonists. They thus make an historical contribution as well as offering source material for further research.

[?] I wish to thank: Ruth Mc Dowell for her valuable work on Sir Roy Denman's transcript; Tracy Carrington for editorial assistance; Michael Smith, Peter Gatrell and Joseph Harrison for supporting my project in different ways, and of course the two lecturers/authors whose company I had already enjoyed when

Audland's account of the first negotiation highlights very clearly the details of the negotiating procedure. It discusses some of the main stumbling blocks, namely the Commonwealth issue and the external tariff, as well as arrangements for agriculture. It also opens up again the interesting debate as to whether, without de Gaulle's veto the talks would have ultimately succeeded. Here there is a difference between the two authors. According to Denman, de Gaulle's veto did nothing more than put the seal to a failing enterprise. Much blame, according to his view, needs to be attached to the rigidity of Britain's negotiating stance and the scarce conviction of her leaders, to the weight of the Commonwealth connection and the opposition from "the barons of the Treasury and the Board of Trade". Indeed Denman goes further and credits de Gaulle with having been fundamentally justified in his vetoing tactics. Audland recognises some of the difficulties, and particularly blames UK inflexibility over agriculture for stalling the negotiating process and opening a window of opportunity for the rejection of the French. He still believes, however, that without de Gaulle's intervention accession could have been clinched. No doubt this issue will be the subject of further discussion and further light will be shed upon it, as more becomes known about attitudes on the other side of the Channel, in the Commission, in France and in the delegation of the member states.²

The 1971-2 negotiations appear to be less contentious.³ The background to them was, of course, The Hague Summit of the Six held on 1-2 December of 1969, in which the Six, together with a number of other initiatives, decided to proceed with enlargement, opening negotiations with Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway. This decision was in line with what Wilson's Labour Government had been trying to achieve since 1967.

The account of the talks by Denman is an abridged version of the relevant section of his informative and provocative monograph, *Missed Chances*, which must be considered one of the best sources available.⁴ The key point seems to have been that the position of the British was much weaker than ten years earlier: there was now in place a considerable body of Community legislation, of which the CAP was just one example. All community decisions rested on a careful balance between national interests. They could, therefore, not be tampered with to suit a new applicant, without unravelling the whole project. Unlike in 1961-2, the British fully realised this and, as Hugo Young, has recently aptly commented, the talks were bound to be "essentially about mitigation, not change, about transitional arrangements not the remaking of the rules to fit a new situation".⁵ Denman acknowledges, in particular, the

difficulty in securing a good solution for the problem of Britain's budgetary contribution to the Community, and shows how this issue was to haunt British diplomacy for many years, providing justification for the aggressive, anti-communitarian tactics of Mrs Thatcher.

Perhaps the most interesting feature of the two papers is that they highlight the importance of civil servants in shaping Britain's European integration policy. This is an important, and somewhat neglected issue, with multifaceted implications. Historians have, generally, trod very carefully trying to characterise the role of civil servants. They have avoided making generalisations and drawing too forceful conclusions. In the acceptable historical version, civil servants are one of the four of five key constituencies, determining policies towards European integration. They are supposed to be subordinate to government ministers and to play a role alongside interest groups, public opinion and perhaps the press. Reading some of the most authoritative accounts of the period, however, it is difficult to maintain this equanimity.

For example, Edmund Dell's scrupulously researched and provocative account of the Schuman Plan concludes that officials were as important, if not more important than were ministers.⁶ He criticises the way "Whitehall and Westminster" rejected participation in the Plan and denounces the short-sighted and defensive reports on the part of the Foreign Office, part of its "remarkable failure" to understand "the contemporary European political dialogue".⁷ Although in no way wishing to exonerate the Labour government of the time, Dell concludes that "an enduring impression from the history of this period is of the subordination of ministers to officials...The policy was the policy of officials and had been accepted by Ministers. Officials, not ministers, were the source of policy though constitutional propriety required the endorsement of ministers...Ministers and officials were of one mind. Ministers had, however, been hardened in their opinions by the 'consistent advice' of officials. They had lacked the independence or, latterly, the intellectual vigour to question it adequately"⁸

Alan Milward in analysing the decision of the British government not to engage with the EEC negotiations has scathing remarks about the prejudices of the officials of the Foreign Office and the Treasury.⁹ He observes how, "the startling absence of genuine comparison with any other European country in the many memoranda and analyses of Britain's economic position gives the impression of a hermetically sealed system with so little outward vision that no understanding of European developments could be possible".¹⁰ In his step by step account of commercial and monetary negotiations during the 1950s it is by and large civil servants that feature, with only fleeting reference to politicians. The technical nature of those discussions

must in any case have restricted the role of elected ministers at most to sporadic interventions. On the broader level of interpretation, it is true, Milward views European integration as being shaped by compromises between differing, all be it often converging, national interests, upheld by some form of democratically accountable domestic political consensus. But how exactly the national interest was represented and the consensus forged, are questions left largely unresolved.

Describing Britain's relationship with Europe in the 1950s, Roy Denman plainly states that Plan G, the decision to try and outflank the Customs Union of the Six with a broader industrial Free Trade Area within the OEEC, was the result of the elaboration of a group of civil servants who "began to be concerned about the impact on British exports".¹¹ Plan G, he argues, was supported by both Macmillan, then Chancellor of the Exchequer and by Thorneycroft, President of the Board of Trade, who "was later to claim authorship of the Plan for himself".¹²

In the paper presented below, Denman, in a similar way to Milward, refers to the power exercised by the "barons" of the Treasury and the Board of Trade during this period, when senior foreign office officials considered economic matters to be beneath their attention. Denman elsewhere also stresses that the discussion within the British government in the summer of 1960 resulting in a closer stance towards the Six, "took place entirely on the basis of a paper by officials (essentially Sir Frank Lee). There was no accompanying or opposing paper by ministers".¹³

According to John Young, to whom we owe the first scholarly attempt by an historian to specifically address the role of civil servants, British European policy was dominated by the Foreign Office until 1954.¹⁴ After that year the Treasury and the Board of Trade became predominant. Young expresses some caution as to the nature of his enquiry: "The main problem with such an analysis, he says, is that it is frequently difficult to divorce the views of civil servants from those of their political masters".¹⁵ He acknowledges, however, that it was civil servants, acting alone, that shaped British policy towards the Treaties of Rome. The decision first to leave the Spaak Committee and then to launch the Free Trade area proposals (Plan G) developed within the Mutual Aid Committee, a group of officials which included the Foreign Office, the Treasury, the Board of Trade and other departments. A few years later, according to John Young, it was the appointment of Frank Lee as Treasury Permanent Secretary to replace Roger Makins that brought new focus in Whitehall over the question of relations to the Six. As an accomplished, but somewhat traditional diplomatic historian, Young's gives the reader the impression that his evidence is dragging him further than he really wants to go. His conclusion, however, are fairly unequivocal: "Across the period 1945-1961" - he argues - "in fact officials

seem, broadly speaking, to have reflected a wider consensus in Britain about Europe... The role of civil servants seems to have been to define British policy in precise terms, devising Plan G for example, rather than break the convention. At best Sir Frank Lee's committee in 1960 speeded up the process of pointing Britain towards EEC membership".¹⁶

No such caution is to be found in the late, brilliantly written, book by Hugo Young, *The Blessed Plot*, a full-scale reconstruction of British attitudes towards Europe since 1945.¹⁷ As a columnist and, in many ways, an insider in the world of politics and government Young brings, to good effect, a whiff of confidentiality to his story, but as a journalist turned historian he has clearly done his homework, having conducted a good deal (although clearly not enough to entirely satisfy the academic mind) of painstaking research both on primary and secondary sources. He also shows a certain healthy disregard for convention. Many of the heroes and the villains of his story are civil servants; in fact the villains are the mandarins that defined the negative orthodoxy towards Europe for most of the 1950s (the Makins, the Jebbs, the Strangs, the Bridges), and the heroes are the younger civil servants, who gradually managed to steer European policy in a more positive direction. Among the latter were both Christopher Audland and Roy Denman.

"...The collective orthodoxy of the Foreign Office throughout the 1950s was, of course, decisive in shaping, rather than challenging, the responses of politicians who, at bottom, wanted most of all to see their own anti-Europe prejudices reinforced" writes Hugo Young.¹⁸ The key officials "were at least equal partners in defining the orthodoxy as regards Europe...Only at the lower level and in occasional outposts were there people who challenged the advice ministers were getting and they were seldom heard".¹⁹

The change of attitude in Whitehall in the late 1950s and early 1960s was due, in large measure, to a generation of new officials, mostly from the Foreign Office, such as Donald Maitland, John Robinson, Christopher Audland, Michael Palliser, Oliver Wright, Michael Butler. Their attention to Europe often came together with a greater interest in economic issues. Acting in conjunction with Frank Lee, who for the first time articulated a non-sceptical approach to Europe at the highest level, this new generation, an "elite regiment", was able to make a difference. "Through Whitehall, argues Young, Europe was a generational as well as an attitudinal issue".²⁰ The failure of the Macmillan negotiations did not turn the tide. On the contrary, it broke a mould and prepared the ground for a continuing European engagement. "On the other hand not only the Macmillan initiative but the passage of time left a significant residue of committed talent, of which John Robinson was but one element. The young men who had

despaired of their superiors' hidebound disdain for the Schuman Plan and the Messina project were rising up the hierarchy".²¹

By 1970 a new consensus was building up in Whitehall; officials had put in great work in preparing the ground for negotiation with the Community. It appears that among the sceptical departments were the Treasury, on the ground of the burden the CAP would impose, and, as always, the Minister of Agriculture. Denman in his paper below recalls his and his colleagues' surprise at the Conservative election victory of 1970 and the hurried repackaging of the brief for the new political masters. Hugo Young insists: "The biggest thing Heath wanted to do was done by people Labour had picked. The caravan was rolling, and by now it was full of believers. The Whitehall hesitations of a decade before had not entirely vanished, but the political commitment to succeed, through the men selected to do the work, was pretty well absolute".²² It should also be observed that the tide in Whitehall at this point did not necessarily reflect the public mood, since in 1970 Heath himself had to tune down his European credentials to assuage the sceptical opinion polls.

There is, therefore, a consensus emerging at least in a significant part of the literature on the great importance played by civil servants in the decision making process. No doubt prominent European politicians will challenge this contention and in the papers that follow there is plenty of evidence to support either side of the argument. Still, there seems to be a need to explore this issue more systematically, looking at how the collective wisdom of important Whitehall department changed over time and at which forces, either internal (careers, generational change, cultural and professional backgrounds) or external (contact with politicians, with interest groups etc) were at work in these changes. We know very little for examples of the inner workings of departments, long considered as marginal, but progressively emerging as, in fact, quite important, such as the Minister of Agriculture and the Board of Trade. Also the Foreign Office and the Treasury would merit further investigation. In this kind of historical work, there is a large room for the oral and written testimonies of the protagonists.

Biographies of the authors

Sir Christopher Audland joined the Foreign Office in 1948. When the Schuman Declaration was made in 1950, he was in Germany, as British negotiator of one of the Bonn conventions, being negotiated in parallel, which were to give the Federal Republic its independence after Allied Occupation. He was then UK Deputy Permanent Representative to the Council of Europe at Strasbourg. In the 1960s he was a member of the British team for the Heath negotiation. When Britain joined the EC in 1973 he joined the European Commission, serving for nine years as Deputy-Secretary General of the Commission. He completed his Commission career by holding the post of Director General for Energy for 5 years. Since his retirement in 1986 he has remained in close touch with Community affairs. Among others, he is Honorary President of Europa Nostra, the main European-level heritage conservation group; he is co-founder of the European Heritage Group, of the European Opera Centre and of Forward in Europe (the Cumbria and N. Lancs Branch of the European Movement).

Sir Roy Denman joined the Board of Trade in 1948 and in 1957 he was posted to the British Embassy in Bonn for three years. He then served in the UK Delegation at the GATT in Geneva (Switzerland) dealing with international trade negotiations with the EEC. In 1961 he was also involved, for the Board of Trade, in the first British entry negotiations. Between 1970 and 1971 he was a member of the team negotiating British accession for the Department of Trade and Industry. In 1975 he joined the Cabinet Office as the Head of the European Secretariat. In 1977 he joined the EC Commission as Director General for External Affairs, a post he held until 1982 when he became Head of EC's Delegation to the US, in Washington. Since retiring he has published widely in many magazines and journals as well as authoring a book, *Missed Chances. Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century*, London, 1997.

The Heath negotiations 1961-1963 **Their origins, conduct and outcome**

By Sir Christopher Audland

It is a pleasure to speak to you about the Heath negotiations. I will take up the story from the entry into force of the Rome Treaties, and carry it forward to the collapse of the Heath negotiations, in January 1963. Roy Denman, a good friend and former colleague, will talk about the sequel, namely the Rippon negotiations, which led to the UK accession to the Communities a decade later.

I shall address my theme under three main headings: first, the origins of the negotiations; second, their conduct; and third their outcome. You may think the third theme surprising, since in one sense the outcome was all too clear, namely failure of the UK application; but there was more to it than that.

I cannot give you masses of facts. I shall concentrate instead on the political climate, and on the way things were done. If you need more data I would refer you to a contemporary and authoritative source. After the negotiations broke down the British Delegation wrote, for the Foreign Office, a full Narrative Report of the negotiations, of over 200,000 words. It was covered

by a substantial commentary, drawing conclusions, both strategic and tactical. This document – from now on called “the Narrative Report” – may be studied in the Public Records Office. I was its general editor.²³

1. THE ORIGINS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

You know how, throughout the 1950's, Britain was virtually absent from the Community scene. Invited successively to join the negotiations for the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Defence Community and the European Political Community, she each time refused. Invited again to Val Duchesse, where the Rome Treaties were devised, she first sent a low-level “observer”, Russell Bretherton, and then withdrew him, because she found the substance of the negotiations too federal for her taste. One is tempted to comment; “Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose”!

The rationale of the Community concept and why it did not attract the support of Britain’s political leaders

It is worth reflecting about why the Community concept, which, then as now, so strongly appealed to the leaders of other key countries of Western Europe, was totally rejected by British political leaders of both major parties, so firmly and for so long.

The concept was viewed by its supporters as a bold and imaginative response to a whole series of problems. First, the nation state were seen as a root cause of two World Wars in 25 years – Wars which had torn the continent apart, killed several tens of millions of its citizens on each occasions, and devastated its economy: a need was felt for effective constraints on the national state, including ones which would anchor a recovering Germany into a democratic framework. Second, Western Europe felt gravely threatened by

Stalin's aggressive empire: a monolith which included all the then numerous Communist countries, and notably China and those of Central and East Europe. Third, it looked as though a world of super-powers was emerging, in which Europe could enjoy real influence only if united. To the Six, the solution of these three problems was so important that they thought it well worth while to pool a considerable measure of sovereignty in order to achieve it: the inter-Governmental approach was considered completely inadequate.

Why did not British political leaders share these views? I do not seek to justify their attitude – which in the early 1950's I already regarded as nonsense – but I do wish to explain it. The underlying reason was that the British experience had been very different from that of the continentals: let us look at that point in more detail.

Before the Second World War, British children were brought up in an atmosphere of triumphant imperialism. Britain ruled huge areas of the globe: first & foremost, the Indian Empire; and second, a vast array of colonies, dependent territories, protectorates and mandates in every single continent. The imperial role was still presented by the establishment as entirely positive: Britain, it was said, had a duty to enlighten the natives of these distant lands and lead them towards a future paradise of economic development and democratic Government. However, few statements were made as to when these goals would be reached.

The atlases from which children were then taught, further increased the feeling of British self-importance; they showed the whole Commonwealth and Empire in pink, even though the old Dominions of Australia, Canada, Ireland, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Africa had long been constitutionally independent.

Britain, with France and the USA, had won the First World War. Britain was, despite the depression of the inter-war years, still a world economic power.

Of course, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and others still had colonies too, but they were not on the same scale.

Then came the Second World War. Britain – apart from neutral Switzerland and Sweden, and the special cases of Spain and Portugal – was the **only** European country to escape occupation by the Germans and/or the Russians – with all that that implied. For a year, Britain stood alone in the world against Nazi Germany. Later, she became the island base from which the United States and Britain, with their allies, together liberated Western Europe. With America, she invented the nuclear bomb. Alone, she shortened the war by breaking all the German cyphers. She was the Americans' principal ally in defeating the Japanese, and thus ending the War. In all this she was strongly supported, of their own free will, by the old Dominions.

Britain's achievements rightly gave her a place at the key Conferences which decided the fate of Europe – Yalta and Potsdam. That place was juridically, but not in power-broking terms, the equal of America's or Russia's. Britain was thus one of the “Big Three” war-time Allies. Moreover, because of the devastating effects of war on the continent, Britain was, in 1945, by far the strongest European economy. Britain felt proud and confident: the continentals, in general, felt defeated and devastated.

The fact that Britain had had, in Churchill, a larger-than-life war leader, with an extra-ordinary capacity for firing the imagination of the whole free world, had added to the widespread illusion that Britain was much stronger than she really was. In politics, attitudes changed slowly. As Hugo Young later commented of Macmillan, grandiosity dies hard.²⁴ And so this mind-set of the British political class was desperately slow to change. Long after the grant of independence to the Indian sub-continent in 1947, which clearly spelt the end of Empire; long after Russia in the 1950's emerged as a major nuclear weapon power, and Britain's special nuclear partnership with America was largely

junked by the latter; long after the mistaken and bungled Franco-British Suez operation in 1956, which showed that not even two large European powers acting together could intervene successfully as a world policeman without American support – long after all these things – British political leaders of both parties went on saying, and apparently believing, that Britain was a world power.

In short, British political leaders were living in the past. They consistently **over**-rated the economic and military strength of the UK, the economic and political importance of the Commonwealth, and the significance attached by the United States to the British connection. They also consistently **under**-rated the importance to us of the Community enterprise, and the determination of the Six to make it work. Those were the root causes of the British attitude of having nothing to do with the Community idea.

The emergence of the Rome Treaties in 1957 shocks the British establishment

The signature and ratification of the Rome Treaties came as a great shock to the British establishment. They had correctly viewed the creation of the ECSC –because it covered only the important, but limited, field of coal and steel – as posing no intrinsic threat to UK interests. But they failed to foresee that this apparently modest step would lead to much greater things. The collapse of the EDC and EPC projects encouraged them to think the contrary. They assumed that the Messina initiative would suffer a similar fate.

When it succeeded, the British establishment at once saw the ball-game had changed. The EEC, from the beginning, covered a huge range of economic sectors: customs union; agriculture; free movement of persons, services and capital; transport; competition; state aids; and economic and social policy. Euratom – the least well-known of the Treaties – was also important, both because of the vast powers it gave to the Community over the whole peaceful

nuclear industry, then seen as fundamental to diversification of energy supply away from Arab oil; and also because it made R&D into a major Community enterprise. Moreover the new Communities started work with remarkably little trouble.

The Maudling Plan of 1956 and the creation of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in May 1960

Once Britain saw that these two new Communities were likely to emerge, the Conservative Government knew it must change direction. It was about to face the very scenario it had hoped would not emerge: a powerful grouping of Six Member States, united at the heart of Western Europe, with the UK completely marginalised. Following the opening of the Val Duchesse talks, the British Government suggested that the Six should be linked with West European countries outside the Community, in a wider free trade area. This concept became known as the Maudling Plan. Negotiations began within the OEEC in 1956; however, two years later, the Six, fearful of seeing their own project diluted or submerged, put an end to them.

The immediate reaction to this set-back was defensive: the creation, in May 1960, of the European Free Trade Association (or EFTA), as a much looser, and purely inter-governmental body with seven Member States (Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK). The “Europe of the Sixes and Sevens” had begun its short life.

Macmillan works towards a British application to join the Communities

Secretly, however, Macmillan, realising that EFTA was small beer, was already contemplating a British application for membership of the Communities. He set about selling the idea to his Cabinet, to the British Parliament, and to the British people. This was never going to be easy. For

fifteen years, Governments of both main parties had been saying much the same thing. They were not themselves convinced that the arguments for the Community idea were sound; they did not object to the continentals trying their hand at it; the latter were unlikely to succeed with such an audacious project; but, if they did, the UK would not wish to be party to anything based on the pooling of large areas of sovereignty. Ted Heath's recent autobiography contains a useful account of how Macmillan prepared public opinion for a U-turn.²⁵

The process started publicly with a Cabinet re-shuffle in the summer of 1960. Alec Home became Foreign Secretary; Ted Heath joined his team at the Foreign Office, to manage European affairs; Duncan Sandys was made Commonwealth Secretary; and Christopher Soames, Minister of Agriculture. Thus, Pro-Europeans were now occupying all the Ministerial posts which would be important in accession negotiations. Macmillan had also, shortly before, arranged the appointment of Frank Lee, another known pro-European, as Joint Permanent Secretary of the Treasury, a key post in Whitehall.

The Whitehall questionnaire exercise

Macmillan now prepared the ground through the Departmental machinery of Government. He launched a review of the whole involvement of Britain in Europe: its relationship with the European Community; whether we should seek association or membership; and what would be the implications of either. That summer, a questionnaire was sent round the Departments, covering many pertinent matters. It was then that I was moved to the Foreign Office Department concerned with European integration, being one of the few middle-ranking Foreign Office officials with practical experience of the whole history of the Community project: another, John Robinson, was already there. It was typical of the times that the unit was called the European **Economic**

Organisation Department, reflecting the establishment's desire to play down in public the essentially **political** character of the Rome Treaties.

The Report containing the answers to the questionnaire, which went to the Cabinet that summer, came down heavily in favour of the UK seeking membership of the three Communities. The political arguments were seen as decisive. British interests would suffer if we were not in the inner councils of Europe. On the economic side, short-term problems were foreseen; but held to be outweighed by long-term advantages. The key problem was considered to be whether arrangements could be made to “*continue or replace the existing régime of duty-free entry for Commonwealth products, particularly temperate agricultural products*”, in other words grains, meat and milk products from the old Dominions. The problems for domestic agriculture and EFTA were dismissed lightly. Those of the new Commonwealth countries, and the Dependent Territories, were scarcely touched on at all.

The consultation process of 1960/61

The Report did however make an important proviso. After the failure of the Maudling Plan, Ministers were advised not to launch another initiative likely to lead to a rebuff. The first step, therefore must be to sound out the Six, and notably France, as to whether they would welcome us into the Community on terms we could accept. Whilst the soundings were taken, there would be talks with the Commonwealth and the EFTA countries. Officials assumed that, in parallel, Macmillan would quietly seek to move the Tory Party, Parliament and public opinion, in the desired direction.

The talks with Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries, predictably showed support. The French were cautious. Clearly General de Gaulle was not keen on UK entry. This was attributed by some to his desire to see the common

agricultural policy in full operation before Britain joined: by others to wider political reasons. But at that time there was definitely no threat to veto.

Consultations with the Commonwealth countries – the new as well as the old – showed them to be very sensitive. The EFTA countries, naturally, were not at all pleased. Meanwhile, at home, the National Union of Farmers became restive. Macmillan did not force the pace at all. But he did not change his underlying view either.

Britain, Denmark, Norway and Ireland apply to join the Communities, August 1961

A year later he finally decided the moment had come to move. He proposed to Cabinet that an application for membership should be made; and this was announced to Parliament at the end of July, 1961. The British application was handed to the Community Presidency on 9 August. Three of our EFTA partners – Denmark, Norway and Ireland – applied simultaneously. The stage had been set.

2. THE CONDUCT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

Establishment of the UK Delegation

During that same summer, arrangements were made to establish the British negotiation Delegation. Ted Heath was of course to lead the Delegation at Ministerial level. Sir Pierson Dixon, at that time Ambassador in Paris was controversially appointed leader at official level, with Eric Roll (now Lord Roll) as his Deputy.

These top people were to be supported by senior officials of different Whitehall Departments. The latter were to remain members of their Departments, and travel to and from Brussels for meetings. Most of them were

titled, and they inevitably came to be described as “the Flying Knights”. They spent about three days a week in Brussels, and the rest of their time in London.

Finally, there was to be a small resident element of the Delegation, permanently stationed in Brussels, whose essential tasks were to underpin the whole team; to gather intelligence within the Community Institutions and the other Delegations; and to ensure continuity and cohesion of the British action on the ground. The resident element was headed by a Counsellor; but he focused mainly on the Euratom negotiations. On the key, EEC side, John Robinson and I moved from London to be the work-horses.

The Flying Knights included some remarkable and charming men, representing notably the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Colonial Office, the Board of Trade and the Treasury. It was a great advantage to have people like this commuting to and fro. They were long enough in London every week – as well as carrying sufficient personal authority – to be able to keep their Departments in line with the development of thinking in the Delegation as the whole and with the flow of the negotiations.

It was one of Ted Heath’s great achievements that he exploited very successfully this situation, in which the Flying Knights had a dual loyalty: to their Departments at home, but also to the Delegation as such. In all cases but one, Ted persuaded the members of the commuting team to be at least as much concerned with the success of the negotiations as with the defence of the perceived Departmental interest. The exception was that temple of arch-conservatism – the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF).

MAFF, at all official levels, from the most senior down, systematically opposed all pressures to alter the British agricultural system. Although Christopher Soames was personally in favour of British accession – and was later a very good Commissioner in Brussels – his senior officials undermined him at every turn. It was they who insisted that – alone of the Departments

principally concerned – MAFF’s representative on the Delegation would not be a Deputy Under-Secretary (DUS) like the others, but would instead be a middle-ranking official who, though intelligent and charming, carried no real weight in his Department; and who resided permanently in Brussels. The result was to leave the MAFF Deputy Under-Secretary in London – an anti-European of the first order – as Christopher Soames’s unfettered adviser.

Everything to be done from scratch

The enlargement negotiations started with a clean slate. At their outset, the EEC and Euratom were less than three years old. Fusion of the Executives of the three Communities was something of the future. The Community authorities were heavily engaged on other important issues. These included: completing the transitional phase established in the Rome Treaties; the development of a common agricultural policy; the future arrangements for community finances; and the conduct of the important Dillon Round of tariff negotiations in the GATT, predecessor to the World Trade Organisation of today.

There were no precedents for handling accession; and literally the only thing the Treaty had to say was that “*the conditions of admission, and the adjustments to the Treaty necessitated thereby, shall be the subject of an agreement between the Member States and the applicant State*”. Yet suddenly the fledgling Community had to cope with applications from four countries, including the very large and particular problems of the UK. It was not only a question of finding answers to the problems of substance: an entire negotiating procedure had to be mounted as one went along. These considerations alone, go far towards explaining the length of the negotiating process.

Preliminary decisions on organisation

An early decision had to be taken on whether the negotiations should be between the Six Member States and the Four applicants **together**; or between the Six and each of the Four **separately**. The Six quickly opted for the second course, and also made it clear that they were going to keep the UK negotiations ahead of the others. In so doing they were influenced by the thought that, if the UK negotiations failed, early accession by the others was improbable.

Another early decision was needed, in relation to each of these four negotiations, on how the Six would behave vis-à-vis the other party. They agreed that they would, by unanimity, establish a Community position on every matter, before discussing it with us. This process had to be repeated if, on any point, the position was not acceptable to the applicant. The arrangement did not make for speed or flexibility in the negotiations, and it gave the French very great leverage. There were one or two occasions when something more like a genuine discussion between seven countries emerged; but only one or two.

There were, and most people have forgotten this, four other preliminary questions on which the Six found it much harder to agree. They were: the venue for the negotiating Conference; whether the Commission should participate in the Conference at all, a matter on which the Treaty was strangely silent; whether the Chair should rotate, as in the Council, or be held by the same person throughout the conference, as at Val Duchesse; and how the Conference Secretariat should be provided. I think you must know what solutions were found to these four questions. Each had a major influence on the negotiations.

Britain was invited by the Six, in advance of the formal negotiations, to make an opening statement about the problems facing the UK and the solutions it envisaged for them. This was done at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris, in October 1961. Constructing this statement in such a way that it would support our claim to be genuine converts to the Community method, keep our

non-Community friends reasonably calm, and yet not offer hostages to fortune in the negotiations, was no easy task for Whitehall. In the event, the opening statement largely met these aims, except that we opened our mouths far too wide on agriculture.

In the Community, agreements are inherently difficult to reach. The power of precedent is correspondingly great. All the organisational decisions about the conduct of enlargement negotiations just described, have been maintained ever since.

The venue

For dogmatic Community reasons, the negotiations did not take place in a building of the Council, but in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Belgium, the host country. The British noted wryly that the Ministry was situated in the Rue des Quatre Bras, remembering that Quatre Bras was the scene of a battle, on the eve of Waterloo, in which the British and their Allies were forced from the field by the French! We tried to take comfort from the fact that the then Headquarters of the European Commission was in the Rue de la Joyeuse Entrée! But history was to repeat itself.

The Ministry building had not been designed to house a Conference of this scale. All the meetings, whether of Ministers or of their Deputies, took place in a low ceilinged room far too small to hold the Delegations of the Six, of the UK, and of the Commission – usually up to 80 people, plus perhaps 10 interpreters in their cabins – in any comfort. The room was not air-conditioned; the windows could not be opened because of the noise of the traffic below; and in the 1960's most Delegates smoked like chimneys, often cigars. My eyes frequently streamed as a result. The temperature was always excessive. When it was hot outdoors, the room resembled the Black Hole of Calcutta. International conferences in those days often suffered from such problems; but

they did not usually continue for 15 months at a stretch. Those who have only met in the spacious, air-conditioned conference rooms of today, can have no conception of the tortures we suffered.

Naturally the Belgian Ministry did not want to give up too many rooms to the Conference; so the individual Delegation Rooms in the building were few and small. This was doubly unfortunate for the Brits because of the way the Six chose to conduct business. As we have seen, there was to be no Conference of the Seven: rather, a Conference of the Six as a bloc, with the UK. On a negotiation day, the Six argued amongst themselves for hours what to say to the British, and were then unable to budge an inch from laboriously agreed positions. So, meetings with us were usually short. But one was never to know when the Six would summon us. So, on Conference days, the British Delegation would often spend hours and hours, cooped in their tiny offices, receiving a copious flow of information about progress among the Six (from Delegations of the Five), and waiting for the call!

The 3 phases of the negotiations

A first, exploratory, phase of the negotiations lasted from November 1961 to Easter 1962. It consisted of the British developing in more detail their views on the issues they had identified in the Opening Statement as needing discussion, and of the Six deploying a response. It soon became clear that, while we could expect considerable derogations from the Rome Treaty rules **during a transitional period**, the Six would be extremely resistant to all proposals from our side for **permanent derogations**.

From as early as end-January, 1962, John Robinson and I felt able to forecast to our superiors the likely content of any eventual Accession Treaty. It was far removed from what the official briefs had defined as the British objectives. But those briefs had always been unrealistic. The Narrative Report

recorded that, in all the hundreds of pages of Whitehall briefing, there was “*hardly a fall-back to be seen*”. After some reflection, Ted Heath agreed that the Delegation should (in March) put to London its assessment of what was likely to be obtainable over the whole field of the negotiations. Although this forecast was very close in the terms of the provisional agreements worked out with the Six by January 1963 – and was subsequently refined in July and again in September – it achieved little. The Narrative Report is again instructive. It read: “*In London ... it was decided to limit circulation of the forecasts severely. Although they no doubt influenced a small number of those directly concerned, they appeared to have no impact on Ministerial opinion generally or on our instructions*”.

A second, analytical, phase lasted from Easter 1962 to the beginning of August. It was by now a British tactical objective to agree with the Six on the broad pattern of the accession arrangements in time for this to be explained to a Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London in September. We put to the Six the notion of reaching a “*Vue d’Ensemble*” by end-July, and it was accepted. Unfortunately, both the French and the British were dragging their feet: the French, for obvious reasons; the British, because Ministers did not give a corresponding instruction to Whitehall Department to provide the Delegation with the necessary negotiating latitude.

The *Vue d’Ensemble* reached was therefore far from complete. But Ted Heath again knew, and certainly communicated to the Prime Minister, the Delegation’s view of what was negotiable.

A third, negotiating, phase lasted from the end of September until the Christmas break in 1962. The Commonwealth Conference at Marlborough House was behind us. I had attended it, and there was no doubt that the Commonwealth countries were now resigned to British accession. Macmillan had also won over the majority at the Conservative Party Conference. To the

Delegation, the way seemed clear for us to be instructed to complete the negotiations rapidly, on the basis essentially of our own forecasts. But the word did not come. The anti-Europeans within the Conservative Party, and amongst the popular press, began to say that Macmillan would now feel free to “sell Britain down the river”. His reaction, amazingly, was to slow down forward movement in order to prove his negotiating machismo!

The subject matter

Before moving on to the culmination of the negotiations, perhaps I should say a few words about the subject matter. In essence, the negotiations turned on the Commonwealth; on agriculture; and on the level of the common external tariff. There was no difficulty about UK acceptance of what we now call the "acquis communautaire", in other words Community legislation that has been adopted under the Treaties. No blocking problems seemed likely with regard to the ECSC and Euratom Treaties.

I have not mentioned EFTA as an issue. It might have become one if the negotiations had looked like succeeding. The British Government had rashly agreed, in EFTA, that the organisation would continue to operate on the existing basis “*at least until satisfactory arrangement have been worked out in the negotiations to meet the various legitimate interest of all members of EFTA*”. This had the advantage that the non-applicant EFTA members were content to leave the UK a free hand to negotiate. But it could have been used by them to impede any final package they did not like.

Very little was said in the negotiations about Institutions. The British side stated from the outset that they accepted the existing institutional structure. They also made clear their assumptions that they would receive the same weight of votes in the Council as France, Germany or Italy, accepting corresponding financial implications; and that English would become the official language.

The Six readily agreed. No further details were raised before the negotiations ended.

3. THE OUTCOME

Skybolt

At the end of 1962 events occurred outside the negotiations which were soon to lead to their termination. The United States Administration had cancelled the development of their Skybolt missile, on which the future of the British nuclear deterrent then rested. Macmillan decided to ask President Kennedy to supply Britain, instead, with Polaris (submarine-based) missiles. He warned de Gaulle of his intention at a meeting in Rambouillet in mid-December; to be told that Britain should abandon its special ties with the United States. A few days later, at Nassau, he put his request to Kennedy, and it was agreed. It was against this political background that the final part of the Conference began in January, 1963.

The Five were by now pressing for the negotiations to be brought to an early and successful conclusion – and it had been settled in December that there would be two “crunch” Ministerial four- or five-day meetings in the second and fourth weeks of the January. The Delegation’s instructions had at last become realistic.

The veto

Ted Heath had famously recorded how he went to Paris, on 11 January, for a private preparatory talk with the French Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, over lunch at the British Embassy, when the only others present were Bob Dixon, Eric Roll and Couve’s Deputy, Olivier Wormser; and how Couve

told him that “*No power on earth can prevent these negotiations from being successful*”. Just three days later, whilst the first Ministerial meeting in Brussels was in course, de Gaulle held the famous Press Conference at which he made clear that he was imposing a veto on British entry into the Community. (Couve was at the Press Conference, not at Brussels.) The key reasons the General gave for considering Britain was not “fit” to enter, were all things which had been evident when he agreed to the opening of the negotiations some 15 months earlier. Couve, much later, admitted in a TV interview that France’s behaviour had been “*une sorte de trahison*”.

The funeral ceremony

After that thunderbolt, various efforts were made by the Five to keep the negotiations going, but to no avail. The last Ministerial meeting, on 29 January, was simply the occasion for a high-class funeral, demonstrating that the Five and the British believed an agreement was to hand and held France solely responsible for the breakdown. I wrote Ted Heath’s own concluding speech, with all the Flying Knights commenting and arguing around me as I dictated each word!

4. REFLECTIONS

What went wrong?

In closing, I wish to express a few brief thoughts about what went wrong; and also about what was achieved, despite the failure to secure immediate British accession.

As to what went wrong, this was exhaustively discussed in the Narrative Report. In essence it seemed to the Delegation clear that the British Government set its priorities too late; that it could have struck a deal, despite

General de Gaulle, if it had moved faster; that we initially over-estimated the extent to which we could obtain arrangements of a more than transitional nature; and that our approach to the Six's Common Agricultural Policy, then in full formation, was unrealistic.

The one point in this list of mistakes which many would challenge is the notion that faster movement might have led to an agreement before de Gaulle was willing to take the blame for failure; and thereby hangs a quite amusing tale.

It has to be remembered that, when we sought negotiations, France was trying to hold down rebellion in Algeria, still one of its Overseas Departments. De Gaulle declared Algeria independent in July, 1962. Once this dramatic move had been accepted by the French people, the General's standing at home rose fast.

After the negotiations ended, the British Embassy in Paris, and the British Delegation for the negotiations, carried out post-mortems. Both addressed the \$64,000 question. The Paris Embassy came up first with their view: in a despatch to the Foreign Office, drafted by Michael Butler (later Sir Michael) and signed by Bob Dixon in his **Ambassadorial** capacity, the Embassy opined that de Gaulle would never in fact have let us in. This vexed the Delegation in Brussels, which was still in the process of drafting its own report and thought differently. In the end, the Brussels Delegation persuaded Bob Dixon that, **in his capacity as its Head**, he should sign a Report, which said the opposite to what he had written in Paris! He was quite uncomfortable about this, but too loyal to the Delegation to refuse. We cannot of course say, objectively, which view was right!

What was achieved

As to what was achieved, despite the failure to secure immediate accession, Ted Heath himself has argued that the Macmillan Government's decision to apply for membership of the Community was seminal; and that it determined the direction, not only of British policy, but also of that of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. He has written: "*It signalled the end of one glorious era, that of the British Empire, and the beginning of a whole new chapter of British history*". I wish this were the whole picture: in fact, 35 years after the Brussels negotiations, there are still many politicians in Britain unwilling to recognise that the days of Empire are past! Nevertheless the broad thrust of Ted's judgement must be sound. The process he launched led almost inexorably to the success of the Rippon negotiations, a decade later, and Ted's own signature in Brussels on the final Accession Treaty.

The negotiations were fruitful in another way too. They set the pattern of all enlargement negotiations. Because the Rome Treaties had so little to say about enlargement, the British were the guinea pigs. The Six, through their negotiations with us, developed a complete methodology for enlargement. It was followed in the parallel negotiations between the Six on the one hand, and Denmark, Ireland and Norway in the other. The methodology has been followed in every enlargement negotiation since then, and is now being applied for the six countries with which the European Union recently began negotiations.

Postscript

I close with an anecdote. Some 8 years later I was Deputy Head of the British Delegation to the talks between the Russians and the three Western Allies, which led to the signing of the Berlin Agreement – an Agreement which governed the position in Berlin until re-unification in 1989. These negotiations

were extremely tough. Most of the actual negotiating was done by the Deputies – with the four Ambassadors coming to the table only occasionally, either to ratify their Deputies' work or to break log-jams.

No negotiations have much chance of success unless all involved build up relations of mutual confidence. This happened in Berlin. Juri Kwitsinski, the Russian Deputy, found it useful to hold regular, completely informal, lunches with his three Allied colleagues in the margin of each of our negotiating sessions. I happened to be host at one of these, because we were meeting in the British Headquarters. In a relaxed moment I remarked to Juri that I had encountered many difficult negotiating partners in my time, but that none had been as tough as the Community in the Heath negotiations and the Russians in the Berlin talks. He at once asked which had been the tougher of the two. I answered that there was no comparison: the Community won hand over fist. Juri was mortified!

Britain's Entry 1970-1972: Prelude, Negotiations and Outcome

By Sir Roy Denman

1. Prelude

I'll start by talking about my experiences in Germany during 1957-1960 when I was sent there from the Board of Trade and attached to the Embassy in Bonn. This, I hope, will give you the perspective of someone who took a modest part in events; some aspects I will raise, moreover, have some relevance even now to the attitude we are adopting towards the unification of Europe. In 1957 I was sent to Germany because I specialised in German as a modern linguist at Cambridge and so it was thought this would be a suitable appointment to widen my horizons. It was the year the Treaty of Rome was signed, and it got about in the press in London that Britain was thinking of joining this organisation. So the Foreign Office became very disturbed at this. It was, they pointed out, "a completely erroneous assumption". It needed, they added, to be "firmly put in its place". And so a telegram was despatched by the Foreign Office rather in the style of a papal encyclical to all in the world and the heads of missions were asked to take the best possible steps to dispel this rumour.

The Ambassador in Bonn called a conference at the Embassy and it was decided that young Denman - I was then a lowly First Secretary - should go out. Partly this was because I'd come under some suspicion as consorting with journalists, who struck me as amusing and interesting people, rather more so than some of the other diplomats there, and partly because I could actually talk

to the "natives" in their own language. It was, therefore, with some suspicion that the Ambassador finally dispatched me.

I had a fascinating week. I drove in my Ford car to Munich and up to Hamburg and Düsseldorf. The Germans were extremely hospitable and friendly. I explained why Britain couldn't join this association forming in Europe, the so-called Common Market. We had our loyalty to the Commonwealth, who had fought with us in two World Wars: we simply couldn't abandon them and put up tariffs on their foodstuffs. We had similar ties to EFTA countries - remember EFTA was formed in 1960 and we already seemed to have a close association with them -; and then we had our long-standing association with the United States. How could we have a special relationship with the Americans if we were huggermugger in with a lot of Europeans? My German friends were helpful and very polite and asked me: "Don't you think, Herr Denman, this point of view is getting a little out of date. After all the Commonwealth is loosening like the expanding universe. India went independent in 1947; African countries are following their example. The Commonwealth is not what it was. You talk of your links with the Americans but generally the Americans are realistic people, they will deal with power wherever they see it, and power is going to be in this Continental bloc. We would like you to join. The War is over, let bygones be bygones. And as for the Scandinavian countries and the Swiss, well surely you are not going to let the best deal for the United Kingdom be determined by your attachment to any of these small countries."

Slowly, hearing this for about a week, I became convinced. I remember crossing the Maximilian Park in Munich one evening trying to digest all this and in a flash of lightning I suddenly saw that this was correct. England's destiny, if it was going to be anything more than a small windswept island on the north corner of Europe had to be in the creation of a united Europe. And then in a moment of youthful folly I went back and told the Ambassador this.

He flew into such a rage, as I've never seen before or since and he cried: "That's not what you were told to go and say, you bloody young fool." He followed that by saying: "Her Majesty's government in the United Kingdom could never possibly associate itself with this continental ragtail and bobtail", and - there was a slight pause - he added "and it was damn impertinent of them anyway to think of going it on their own."

In those two sentences we have a good summary of British attitudes towards Europe up to this very day. We didn't want to get involved in all this continental business and become a province, putting ourselves at the same level as them, eating garlic or wüerst. But it was inconvenient that they were getting together, because that posed the question of what would we do isolated and away from this increasingly powerful throng? Well, I was nearly sent back to London. But that gave me a first indication of some of the problems that would be involved in British integration into Europe. And it told me several other things at the same time: the young Germans I was talking to were convinced, every one of them, that something like this had to be done to prevent another war coming about. Yet a number of people now argue, and you will have seen this in the press a number of times and some of my journalist friends in Brussels have taken this line occasionally: "Well, this is only an idea that was about in 1950 and the world has moved on since then, there's never going to be another war in Europe, that's ridiculous, so why continue with a mechanism that was developed just after the war, now all these years later?"

To them I would say: memories stick with you a long time. I was born in 1924, six years after the First World War ended. My father served in France for four years and I remember as a small boy in the 1930's hearing my fathers' friends talk about the First World War and it was pretty ghastly. They recalled how, on the Somme, in July 1916 which saw in one day 20,000 British dead in two hours, how they'd seen a London bus coming back with what was left of a

battalion of the Somerset Regiment and, small boy as I was, I asked: "How many people in a battalion?" And one of my father's friends replied "Eight hundred". I remember finding it difficult to go to sleep at the age of about 12 thinking how 750 men could disappear in two hours. So while I was born after that war, I grew up being conscious of it. And there are many people in Europe now who were born after the Second World War but from folk memory and what they read about it are still as convinced as those of 1950 and of 1955 that you need something to hold national ambitions in check.

Another thing that became clear to me even in those days in Germany was that it wasn't just a question of historical memories, it was a question of economics. Walter Hallstein, who was the first President of the European Commission, - he took up his post in January 1958 - soon after pronounced the immortal phrase: "Customs union, economic union and political union." "Why did he say that?" I asked my German friends. "Well", they said, "he's been referring to a League of Nations report published in 1931 and republished by the United Nations after the Second World War - a report on Customs Unions".²⁶ And what the report said in its concluding paragraphs was this: for a customs union to exist you have to have free movement of goods; for a customs union to be a reality you have to have free movement not only of goods, but also of people and of capital. Once you get as far as that and you create a single market then you cannot have exchange rate adjustments interfering in the process. Imagine what would happen in the United Kingdom now if Yorkshire became independent and devalued the Yorkshire pound. People would say it was very unfair competition for all those surrounding Yorkshire and they would have to react by defensive measures including import quotas and competitive devaluation, which was one of the curses of the 1930s. But to avoid exchange rate adjustment you have to have a co-ordination of economic policies and some measure of co-ordination of taxation and for that some political mechanism is

required; so Hallstein was right. He was summarising the conclusions of that report, which men have largely ignored ever since.

So for those reasons it was clear to me in those days, along with my German contemporaries, that the movement was running strongly towards a united Europe, not simply a European trading arrangement, but something like a federation, not a copy of the United States or Germany or Switzerland but some form of federation. Well, then after three years, I went to Geneva, to our delegation in the GATT. I spent a year negotiating with the Community in the first tariff negotiation after the European Community had been set up and I got to know friends there very well. There was also the EFTA group of the Scandinavians and the Swiss and then you had what was called in those days the Six, and the Commission who spoke on their behalf. I found the Commission and the Member States much more interesting than the other Europeans, because they were doing something new, they were building a new world, a new federation whereas the Scandinavians and the Swiss were still ensconced in their old positions. They wanted to keep any interference to national objectives to an absolute minimum.

And when I went back after a year to London to deal with some of the tariff questions involved in the negotiations Christopher Audland has already described, I was struck by the different terminology employed in London. In Geneva they talked about the *adhésion de la Grande Bretagne aux traités communautaires*. Back in London the discussion was about joining a Common Market, with a view perhaps to selling more cotton goods and marmalade. Though the Common Market was part of the continental scheme, it was not, as they saw it, the end of the enterprise. And the other thing that became very clear to me coming back to London, even more than when I was in Bonn, was the attitude of Whitehall. The Foreign Office in those days - it only changed when people like Christopher Audland came to prominence later - was not

terribly interested in economic questions. The Ambassador I worked under in Germany once declared roundly that gentlemen did not concern themselves with trade. You may think that laughable now, it wasn't laughable in 1960. And the barons of the Board of Trade and the Treasury were solidly against any involvement in Europe. Their view, solidly held, was that the future of world trade lay in multilateral negotiations in the GATT with everyone involved, where everyone would take small steps in scaling down their tariffs on a completely non-discriminatory basis. They were not entirely without logic, because it did not appear to them that European countries would take the very bold step of abolishing their tariffs against each other, particularly in the case of the French who had long had since Colbert a tradition of protectionism.

And indeed to the establishment of the Community in France there was a great opposition. If you read the memoirs of Robert Marjolin the first Secretary General of the OEEC, a man who left school at fourteen and worked his way through the French system - a formidable intellect -, he reports that almost everybody in France was against the idea of abolishing their tariffs against the formidable Germans with their heavyweight industry. They did so essentially because they had vetoed the European Defence Community, which came too soon after the second great civil war of the century in Europe and they felt, not unreasonably and with their customary intelligence that they couldn't say "no" twice. So they joined with great misgivings what was then called the Common Market and which then showed Adam Smith to be right and was a resounding success.

The other comment I would make about the 1961 negotiations, and I don't essentially differ with Sir Christopher on this, is that seen from an vantage point of someone who had been in Continental Europe for some years, the British attitude was strangely unreal. Jean François Deniau a brilliant Frenchman who was a Commission official, he was Director General of DGI,

External Relations (a position I myself was to hold some years later), then became a Commissioner and French foreign trade minister, was a very witty man and wrote a memoir recently where he described the British attitude in the first negotiation as wanting the Community to join the Commonwealth.²⁷ Ted Heath's 1961 statement was delivered with some passion because he was the only Prime Minister we've had since the war who knew something about Europe and was a European. On the other hand, he had to operate down lines determined by his colleagues, by Harold MacMillan in particular, and once you got over the initial enthusiasm which he displayed in setting out his objectives in our negotiations, then you rapidly began to see that British enthusiasm was very diluted. He felt he had to make the point that some people wondered whether membership of the Commonwealth was compatible with membership of the Community. Now, I would agree with Christopher Audland that if we'd pushed forward in the second year, in 1962, we could probably have got an agreement. But you have to remember that MacMillan was operating under tremendous pressures: there was the Commonwealth, the sense of losing the American connection, and there was the pressure in Whitehall from the barons of the Treasury and the Board of Trade.

And it's worth saying something to you now about the Commonwealth pressure because it's not easy to convey now the way in which it was felt generally in the United Kingdom. In two world wars the Commonwealth had been unstintingly at our side. I remember in 1939 when I reached the ripe old age of 15, reading in the papers the day we declared war and all over the world the countries of the Commonwealth were joining in and declaring war on Germany on the same day. There was one headline, particularly moving, from New Zealand, from the New Zealand Prime Minister that said quite simply, he said: "Where Britain stands, we stand. Where Britain goes, we go." In the First World War a quarter of a million Commonwealth soldiers died, coming from all

over the world, ten thousand miles from Australia and New Zealand; three thousand miles from Canada, fighting for a country they had never seen. It seemed to many outrageous for anyone then to say to the Commonwealth: "Friends you have supported us in two world wars, and we thank you for it but now we find its in our interest to strike a commercial deal with the French, the Italians and the Germans and we are going to put up tariffs on your exports to us of raw materials and food." It was a real mental block. And of course it was encouraged by the Beaverbrook press and the Commonwealth countries themselves that were not happy for us to go in and said so.

The other element which comes in, the historical element which I mentioned earlier was the fact that one thing we English have never understood about the Second World War in Europe is defeat and occupation. The English Channel saved us from being occupied in 1940. But if you have been defeated, there is not only the shame of defeat, but also the horrors and divisiveness of occupation. I don't think France has yet fully come to terms with it. Occupation means that some people adapt themselves to the new regime, and indeed in 1940 if the Germans had marched in and occupied this country, it would have been perfectly plausible for people to have said - look we don't really like Hitler but he's here and there's nothing we can do to squash the mighty Wermacht, which is shortly going to rule from the Bay of Biscay to the outskirts of Moscow. We simply have to make the best of it and get along with the new German power. And the people who did that would then face a terrible reckoning if Germany had been defeated. The memory, the folk memory, of the two World Wars is very different in Europe. In England the folk memory of the Second World War is Spitfires high in the sky and Very Lynn singing "There'll always be an England" and the sinking of the Bismarck. It is not a mental fault; it's the failure to have an experience common to all the Continentals.

These, therefore, are some introductory reflections on what we faced when the first negotiations for accession failed. Ted Heath still thinks the negotiations could have been saved. I would doubt it. People, as well versed as Emile Noël the former Secretary General of the Commission, and Walter Hallstein, were much more doubting and so were the Germans in Bonn when I went there. And so the situation when the negotiations collapsed was grim and became even grimmer when the Wilson Government took office in 1964, because the Labour Party then was violently opposed to any form of European integration. The Labour Party then consisted of a peculiar half and half mixture of extreme left wingers who often were followers of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union and moderate labour social reformers; but for most of them the continent was a sort of Catholic capitalist conspiracy which would prevent a good Labour government trying to bring about changes in the redistribution of wealth they thought necessary for justice to come to the British society.

And then things began to change. In 1964 Wilson became Prime Minister. He was not someone who liked Continentals very much. I worked with him twice. He was a complicated man, extraordinarily intelligent but his main priority was performing feats of great tactical skill to keep the Labour party together. He liked people from the Commonwealth; you could sense sometimes the time he'd spent as a small boy in Australia in 1930s. He liked Scandinavians socialists and was in good terms with Mikoyan and some of the Moscow hierarchy. But of Continentals he had a poor opinion.

But then he found after coming into office that things were going wrong for him. The Commonwealth was violently critical of him, a number of them, because he refused to take forcible steps against Rhodesia. Then the government put on a surcharge of 15% on all imports, and this in defiance of the fact that we had signed a treaty with our EFTA Associates, prohibiting any such thing. And so his friends, the Scandinavian socialists turned out to be not so

friendly after all. And then thirdly his economic policy was going wrong and so he brought into play a massive deflation program, which obviously was unpopular. So I think it's only justifiable to think that he conceived of cuddling up to Europe as a diversion or reaction to some of these domestic political difficulties which he suddenly found himself in. So his first step was a tour of the capitals of the Six with George Brown his Foreign Secretary, who was an extremely formidable pro-European. A very difficult character, George Brown was mercurial, brilliant, arrogant and sometimes all these things at the same time, not at all easy for an official to deal with, and he and Wilson touring the capitals of the Six must have been a considerable sight. At one point they appeared in Paris. De Gaulle was impressed by George Brown. "Monsieur Brown", he said later to his friends, "une personnalité intéressante, même s'il m'appelle Charlie". Imagine someone calling the General "Charlie"! And then Wilson reported back to the Cabinet and said it had all gone splendidly and that de Gaulle was particularly interested by the figures he had quoted of corn production. Dennis Healey, who was sharp, asked: "How did he show he was impressed?" "Well", said Wilson, "he didn't say anything." "Perhaps - said Healey - he was bored." Wilson had a passion for statistics, which was not always shared by many of his listeners.

I would add one point on General de Gaulle. I always think that he was right to veto our application in 1963. I'm not sure that Christopher Audland would agree with this. The General didn't veto our accession for noble reasons, as somebody said, he didn't want two cocks on one dunghill. He wanted France to have a position of power at the centre of the Six, which would have been diluted if Britain had joined the Community. But he did make the point at the conference in 1963, that Britain was not yet ready. It was true then, and it would be true even now. He referred in majestic French to "L'Angleterre, insulaire, maritime". And what he was really asking was whether Britain really

wanted to join in the construction of a United Europe. Not abandon its friends in EFTA and the Commonwealth and the United States but to say that the first priority was building a united Europe. And the honest answer was no. And it still remains no, even up to this day.

2. Negotiations

Britain's reapplication, which came in the late Sixties by Wilson, was turned down. Then, of course, de Gaulle went, and Pompidou took charge in France. Pompidou was a very clever man who remembered the days when de Gaulle was shunned by Churchill and Roosevelt. He was not against England coming in, providing that the British were prepared to play ball and build a united Europe. He took the view that the French would have some difficulty always managing to keep Britain out. So he signalled that he was willing to countenance application negotiations, which the Wilson Government then prepared for. The negotiating team was announced in April of 1970. And then something took place, the significance of which has not been fully appreciated. There was an election in June and we had not even got as far as the first meeting with the Six. Everyone expected Wilson to be returned. After all he had come to power in 1964, he had had six years, the country seemed at peace, the sun was shining and there was no great reason for discontent. And so we prepared in Whitehall as we do for any Government coming up to an election, a full briefing, a very full brief for the Labour Government which we expected to return, and a very skimpy one for the Conservatives. And then on the day one of the great upsets of history took place and the Conservatives came in. We all hastened back later that day to the Cabinet Office frantically to rewrite and improve the submission to the Conservative Government.

Now why was this important? It was important because if Wilson had won that election we would not now be members of the European Union. Something had gone wrong in the personal relationship between Wilson and Pompidou. Wilson thought Pompidou when he had come to London a few years back had been arrogant and haughty. And when Pompidou gave a state dinner at the French Embassy Wilson turned up at coffee at 10.15. He did say that he'd been involved in a debate in the House but Pompidou took this late attendance as an insult. Had Wilson made the application we were preparing the meeting that later happened with Edward Heath wouldn't have lasted five minutes. Wilson would have been shown the door and the negotiations would have been declared over. Neither he nor Callaghan would have been able to revive them before they left office in 1979. The idea of Mrs Thatcher taking such a step was quite impossible. So we would not be members the European Community to this very day.

So Wilson losing the election was a great step forward because Heath was a passionately convinced European. I asked him once on a plane why he was so committed to Europe. He said it was because he attended the Nationalist Socialist Party Rally in Germany in September 1937 - and I've seen newsreels of it, a tremendously theatrical occasion with masses of banners and marching throngs. He said he went away convinced that if he was to do one thing in his life it would be to try and help prevent this dreadful spectacle ever recurring, because he could see that it was leading to a war.

Well the negotiations started effectively in July 1970 and had a more modest and more realistic remit than the first ones, not that I'm blaming the negotiating team in 1963, but no one had then yet dealt with the Community and they were as yet unfamiliar with the some of the intricate ways in which Community policy was formulated. Our views had also become more realistic: in the first negotiations we wanted everything, and in the second we realised

that it really came down to New Zealand. If the result was that Canada and Australia had to face some tariffs on their basic exports, well that was something we couldn't avoid, but New Zealand was important, partly because it was also almost a mono-culture based on wool and meat, and they simply could not find quickly enough outlets for their exports if these were blocked. And also because of the feeling in the Conservative Party, going back to the war, that New Zealand had been, of the entire Commonwealth the most faithful. I had to point out once to Commission colleagues that for a country of three million to keep one division in the field was the equivalent of Germany marching 21 divisions of the Wehrmacht across the world.

And so the negotiations turned potentially on New Zealand. Had the New Zealand Prime Minister got up in Wellington 10,000 miles away on the other side of the world said "This is no go", the Conservative Party would have voted against Europe without hesitation. So New Zealand was the nub point in those negotiations.

A second very important point was financial because, as you are probably aware, the system of financing does not suit Britain at all. Like many of these things it shows that if you join something that you didn't set up you come off badly - the French have a proverb which says "Les absents ont toujours tort". If you're not there and fighting for recognition of your interests, then if you decide later to join the club you have a very difficult situation because people say: "It doesn't suit you, well why didn't join the first time and make your point then? We don't want to change the arrangements now." But then something like two-thirds of the Community budget went into supporting agriculture. We had largely abolished our agriculture by the Agricultural Corn Laws of the middle nineteenth century and so we were contributing far more than we got back, the origin of Mrs Thatcher saying "I want my money back". It was clear to all of us that we could not change that situation in our negotiations and so we tried our

best to get a modest contribution working up to a more reasonable level later on, realising that this could only be tackled as part of a negotiation within the family of the Community. We were assured at the time by the Commission if unacceptable situations arise in any member state it is in the interests of the Community that solutions be found. Even then, it would prove later a hard life.

There were some other very basic items: we wanted satisfaction for Commonwealth sugar for example. And then there were a whole raft of questions to settle: how did we transit to adopt the common external tariff, how did we protect various British industrial interests who would find themselves paying a tariff when they had free entry in Britain under our old rules; how to transit to agriculture, and here again agriculture was very difficult, the British agricultural establishment was in many ways as tiresome and difficult as the Commonwealth one. They didn't want their arrangements changed to suit some damned foreigner.

At the initial meeting held in Luxembourg in July 1970 Anthony Barber - who spent a short period as minister responsible before he went to the Treasury and Geoffrey Rippon arrived to take over - read out our initial statement together with the Danes and the Irish and the Norwegians, the other countries applying to join. It was short, and said that we accepted the *acquis communautaire*, what had been agreed by the Six already. We wanted certain modifications and we signalled New Zealand and Commonwealth sugar and one or two other items but it was much less comprehensive and more realistic than the statement we made in July 1961. There were approving nods around round the table from the Six. And then the Norwegians spoke and they referred to the Treaty of Rome as not a good basis to begin with. That was almost like someone getting up and uttering some anti-religious thought in a sermon in a cathedral. There was a noise like growling lions at feeding time from the

Commission benches, and the Norwegians did not get very far in their attempt to join the Community.

When we discussed procedure, this turned out to be not as the first negotiation had been between seven countries with the Commission present, but negotiations of the British, the Danes, the Irish and the Norwegians with the European Community. The chairman of the Council of Ministers spoke, on the advice of the Commission, and the French held very rigidly to the view that everything had to be settled by the Six themselves, not in discussion across the table with the British, or the Danes or the Irish. Indeed on one occasion the only question at issue at the end was the date for the next meeting. And Rippon said: "Surely we discuss the date ourselves?" "No, no - we were told - we will come to a decision among the Six and then let you know." So we filed out and Luns, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, a man of great wit - as the Brits went out the door, so we were told later, he said "Enfin, seules!" with a great shout of laughter from the delegations of the Six, except of course, the French. So we adopted a working system of a meeting between ministers once a month and then every fortnight at official level the negotiating team, headed by Con O'Neill, a very distinguished diplomat, and the officials of the Six. After each of these we had to interview the EFTA countries and the Commonwealth countries and tell them what we were doing to make quite sure they were being kept in touch, because again by our failure to act straight away at the beginning and join, we were under an obligation to EFTA and the Commonwealth at the same time. It placed some restraints on our negotiating ability.

Well, we made some progress but very slowly and as 1971 dawned it became clear that something had to be done to - I won't say to crack French resistance - but to convince the French that this was a deal which should be done. So after contacts with the Elysée, Ted Heath went across and saw Pompidou in May. And that was the key episode in those negotiations. Heath

was closeted with Pompidou for two days with only interpreters present, Heath's interpreter, Michael Palliser, of our Embassy in Paris, Pompidou and Prince Andronikoff, his interpreter. Neither Heath nor Pompidou understood a word of each other's language, yet they hit it off. Pompidou began by saying - I saw the records afterwards: "Now Monsieur Ete, let's try and do business. I've been a banker. I don't want to argue about 2,000 tons of New Zealand meat or mutton. I want to know whether we want the same things, you want to apply to join the Board, do we want the same things for Europe? Do we want a united Europe?" And while there were some quite tough discussions Heath was of course able to convince him in two days. So Pompidou gave the Press Conference, which I still remember, afterwards, in the same Salon where de Gaulle had pronounced his "No" in 1963. He said: "People have said that France wants to block these negotiations and that they won't be successful. Well, ladies and gentlemen you see today two who are convinced of the contrary." And he said this smiling broadly. "Of course there were people in Brussels who would continue to stay up all night - it was their hobby - but I believe that an agreement is possible soon."

Well, that was a tremendous step. It was still not easy, because on the New Zealand side you had the hard liners such as John Marshall who was negotiating on behalf of New Zealand.²⁸ Then at the Quai d'Orsay were still the old hard liners who when they got a directive from Pompidou, pretended not to know or didn't want to know and then down the line they would find ways of making things more difficult. So we sat up all night, the team, in Luxembourg in June - Ministerial Meetings were held there in April, June and October. And after two or three nights we got a breakthrough and we had an agreement which Marshall thought he could accept and said he would recommend it. And I remember it well - we filed in, it must have been just as dawn was breaking and the Council was meeting in Luxembourg. The room was very tall and there was

a red blood dawn, and the champagne was passed round and the French Foreign Minister, Maurice Schumann was asked by a French reporter I knew, how he felt about this. Was he really happy to let the English enter the camp? What would the General have thought? For a moment Schuman hesitated and then he said: "I would have told the General that I had far less difficulty defending this chapter in my life than many others."

Then there was some clearing up to do, which can be tiresome but we had underestimated badly in the delegation, the trouble with the fisheries. As logical men we thought fisheries would not pose a problem, being one tenth of one percent of Britain's GNP in 1970. But unfortunately the issue had roused fishermen - men who regard fish with a great passion and as someone conveyed to me acted as if the Armada was sweeping up to their beaches and taking away all their fish. But finally we signed in Brussels in January 1972. Heath came across, Harold Wilson was asked, but he preferred to go to a football match. I need say no more.

Then there was a long battle to get the result through the House of Commons because the Labour Party were, most of them, vehemently opposed. It only got through because Roy Jenkins - who with Edward Heath must get the credit of allowing Britain to join - took some 68 pro-European supporters into the division lobby against the Labour Party line. This took some courage from Roy Jenkins. I think he forfeited his chance of being Prime Minister by this action. But it worked. It was a long hard slog, with vote after vote. It was difficult for the pro-Europeans in the Labour Party to continue their full support, because there was a chance that the Conservative Government might be brought down, and no party man will ever miss an occasion of bringing down the government of the day. So an informal system of consulting developed. Not all the Labour pro-Europeans would vote for the Government every time. But

enough would vote to ensure that on no single issue was the Government defeated. So finally the Bill went through.

3. Outcome

The rest of the story is not so happy. I saw something of it from the Cabinet Office where I worked directly for Wilson and Callaghan after Heath was defeated. Heath was a man of enormous qualities and for his work in bringing us into Europe I think Britain should be grateful to him. But he was a very stiff, prickly personality. Had he been Prime Minister for longer, our affairs in Europe would have prospered much more than they did. But Wilson and Callaghan in succession were negative, they gave the impression they didn't like this commercial arrangement into which they had been lured and they immediately wanted a renegotiation of the terms of entry. Now this was partly a farce. Officials beavered backwards and forwards to Brussels obtaining statements of varying degrees of banality, but there was not much change. Wilson liked to claim that he got a better deal on access for New Zealand butter and cheese, but this was virtually guaranteed in the accession negotiations. An arrangement was made to meet some of our budgetary difficulties, the official level of our contribution being considered too high. But the rebate was on a scale so small as to have no great practical effect.

These arrangements did however enable a Referendum to be held in 1975. It is worth bearing in mind the circumstances because you will hear many people saying: "Well, if we have a Referendum on a single currency, it will be like 1975 when there was a solid majority against confirming the term of entry at the beginning of the year, and a two-thirds majority in favour when the Referendum was held." But the situation was different. In 1975 nearly all the press was in favour of our joining Europe. The Times had a headline saying:

“The Times is a European Newspaper” and really the opposition came from Beaverbrook, the Daily Express and the Evening Star. And none of the heavyweight, respected politicians were against it. Barbara Castle and Peter Shore and Anthony Benn were against, but they were regarded as not very serious. And above all, the British people are slow to move, and what they were being asked in 1975 in effect was - are you content to remain in the commercial arrangement which will allow you to sell our cotton underwear and marmalade in Paris, Milan and Düsseldorf free of duty. And the majority of them said “Yes”.

No one pointed out to them that the objective was, as Robert Schuman said, when he proposed in 1950 the Coal and Steel Community, a federation. No one had yet explained the implications. Neither Wilson nor Callaghan wanted to go beyond simply a commercial arrangement. So the seeds of dissent were there.

Then Mrs Thatcher came in. At first she did not create such a bad impression. Then she got hooked on her belief that Britain’s budgetary contribution had to be reduced. It has to be said that she was, up to a point, right. Such an outrageous disparity between what we put in and what we got out was not tolerable. It was, again, one of the results from not joining at the beginning. The same story will happen with the Euro. We shall be saying: “Oh, we don’t like that, it doesn’t suit us.” “Too bad” the others will say “You weren’t there at the time, why should we alter our arrangements now for you”.

But the trouble was that Mrs Thatcher’s tactics were so abrasive – it was Peter Carrington who said that Mrs Thatcher wanted a grievance much more than a solution. She wanted a stick with which to be able to beat these accursed foreigners. As I say in “*Missed Chances*”²⁹, I think of Mrs Thatcher as a Grantham schoolgirl during the war when she could hear the German bombers overhead. They were terrible people and so were the Italians, and the French

and the Belgians were a lousy lot because they had been defeated. But Britain had been triumphant together with her American and Commonwealth allies. I think her view of the outside world had never got much beyond that.

So a row rapidly developed only resolved by some very skilful diplomacy toward which Peter Carrington made a great contribution in 1984. And there was a time when there was this growing feeling in the corridors of Brussels that Mrs Thatcher took so extreme a line on the budget that the rest of the European Community would simply say: "Right, we are going to sign a new agreement among ourselves; and you will take a back seat. You might enjoy some free trade, but you will have no say on what is going on in Brussels."

Well, Thatcher went, and her going, of course, was provoked very largely by her experiences in Europe and the feeling in the Conservative Party that her extremism might cost us too dear. John Major came in and he was a decent man, but he was grappling with problems far beyond his background or understanding. This became increasingly clear during the beef war where he was reluctant to enforce adequate control of beef, leading to measures being taken to block our exports and then took a foolish decision to block all Community business. It never worked for a moment. Everyone at the table in Brussels has a great deal that he or she wants to get through and this is dependent on mutual give and take over the whole field. For anyone to say, "I'm going to block everything", simply means that what that country wants is also blocked.

And now we have Mr Blair. People got so fed up with John Major that even Genghis Khan might have seemed desirable. And so great relief was expressed when Mr Blair arrived. He seemed young and dynamic and had a flashing smile and white teeth. But it soon became apparent that not much had changed. And for example when the Euro began to take form the attitude of the British press was "This thing will never work". When the Coal and Steel

Community was set up they said: "It will never work". When the Common Market arose they said: "It will never work"; and the same thing is being said now about the Euro. The crucial commitment has still to be given. Mr Blair said the other week that he was now prepared to push the Euro forward in Britain. His statement added nothing essentially to what the Chancellor had said eighteen months ago that we would apply to join the Euro when the conditions were right. And he left certain questions which are very important unsolved such as how do you deal with the sterling rate, because now it is far too high to be sustainable. This is linked to our high interest rates. How are we going to bring them down to for entry? Will small and medium business be ready, because they have to spend something like six million dollars and they won't spend it until we take a firm decision to enter? And will it be explained that joining a single currency will lead to some form of federation? The important thing is that the British people should be clear about their choice. The question is not "Do you want to join a single currency?" It is "Do you want to join a single currency as one step towards some form of European federation?" The difficulty that Mr Blair faces is that within the single currency area co-ordination of economic policy and taxation will mean an increasing degree of political unity, and this, I think the British people would be very reluctant to accept.

So this is the story of our negotiations from 1970 – 1972 and what followed. It is partly personal but I think it gives you some insight into what was in hearts and minds at the time. On the whole it is a rather sad story. The only bright period was the Heath Government of 1970-74. He got us into Europe. Since then we have got stuck. I hope that something similar might happen over the next few years, but I am not optimistic.

Notes to Introduction

¹ See, among others, M. Camps, *Britain and the European Communities 1955-1963*, London, Oxford U. P., 1964; W. Kaiser, *Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945-1963*, London, Macmillan 1996; N. Piers Ludlow, *Dealing with Britain. The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997; J. Singleton and P. Robertson, "Britain, butter and European integration, 1957-1964", *Economic History Review*, L (1997), n.2, pp. 327-347; R. Steininger, "1961: Europe 'at Sixes and Sevens': the European Free Trade Association, the Neutrals, and Great Britain's Decision to Join the EEC", *Journal of European Economic History*, 26 (1997), n. 3, pp. 535-568; G. Wilkes (ed.), *Britain's Failure to Enter the European Community 1961-1963. The Enlargement Negotiations and the Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations*, London, Frank Cass 1997;

² see, for example some of the contributions contained in A. Deighton and A. S. Milward (eds.), *Widening, Deepening and Acceleration: The European Economic Community 1957-1963*, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag/Brussels, Bruylant, 1999;

³ on the 1971-3 negotiations see, among others, U. Kitzinger, *Diplomacy and Persuasion. How Britain joined the Common Market*, London, Thames and Hudson, 1973; S. George, *An Awkward Partner. Britain in the European Community*, third edition Oxford, Oxford U. P., 1998, pp. 42 ff.; C. Lord, "Sovereign or Confused? The 'Great Debate' about British Entry to the European Community 20 Years On", *Journal of Common Market Studies*, xxx (1992), n. 4, pp. 419-436;

⁴ R. Denman, *Missed Chances. Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century*, London: Indigo 1997;

⁵ H. Young, *This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair*, London, Macmillan, 1998, p.228;

⁶ E. Dell, *The Schuman Plan and the British abdication of leadership of Europe*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995;

⁷ *ibidem*. p. 284 and p. 285;

⁸ *ibidem*, p. 295;

⁹ A. S. Milward, *The European Rescue of the Nation State*, London, Routledge, 1994;

¹⁰ *ibidem* p. 431;

¹¹ R. Denman, *Missed Chances*, cit. p. 201;

¹² *ibidem*;

¹³ *ibidem*, p.211;

¹⁴ J. W. Young, "British Officials and European Integration, 1944-1960" in A. Deighton (ed.), *Building Postwar Europe - National Decision-Makers and European Institutions 1948-1963*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 87-106;

¹⁵ *ibidem*, p. 87;

¹⁶ *ibidem*, p. 102;

¹⁷ H. Young, *This Blessed Plot*, cit.;

¹⁸ *ibidem*, p. 176;

¹⁹ *ibidem*, p. 70;

²⁰ *ibidem*, p. 176;

²¹ *ibidem*, p. 177;

²² *ibidem*, p. 224.

NOTES

²³ Narrative Reports by the UK Delegations to the Conferences at Brussels and Luxembourg for British Accession to the European Communities: 1961-3", this document is now at PRO, FO371, 1715442: M1091?542G, 26.2.1963;

²⁴ H. Young, *The Blessed Plot. Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair*, London, Macmillan, 1998 p. 127;

²⁵ E. Heath, *The Course of My Life. An Autobiography*, London, Hodder and Staughton 1998, chapter 8;

²⁶ United Nations, *A League of Nations Contribution to the Study of Customs Unions*, Lake Success, 1947;

²⁷ J. F. Deniau, *Memories de 7 vies*, Paris, Plon 1974;

²⁸ John Marshall was New Zealand's Deputy Prime Minister;

²⁹ R. Denman, *Missed Chances. Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century*, London, Indigo 1997.